

Message Text

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 STATE 100722 TOSEC 110139

65

ORIGIN PA-02

INFO OCT-01 PRS-01 ISO-00 SS-15 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSC-05

NSCE-00 /024 R

DRAFTED BY PA/M:JCHAMBERLAIN:JC

APPROVED BY PA/M:WDYESS

S/S:FVORTIZ

DESIRED DISTRIBUTION

PA, S/S, /PRS

----- 124260

P 261042Z APR 76 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY PRIORITY

UNCLAS STATE 100722 TOSEC 110139

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: SOPN, US, XA, AO, PFOR

SUBJECT: PRESS MATERIAL

1. HERewith FULL TEXT ANTHONY LEWIS COLUMN, OP-ED PAGE
NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, APRIL 26, HEADED "THE WIND OF
CHANGE: II."

2. MR. KISSINGER'S AFRICAN TOUR IS A SIGN, AT LEAST, THAT
THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT MAY FINALLY BE TAKING AFRICA SERI-
OUSLY. AN OPTIMIST WOULD HOPE FOR MORE: THE BEGINNING OF
A CONSIDERED AND RATIONAL AFRICAN POLICY. BUT BEFORE THAT
COULD HAPPEN, WASHINGTON WOULD HAVE TO UNDERSTAND THE CON-
SEQUENCES OF ITS PAST FOLLY IN THE AREA.

3. ANGOLA IS THE EXAMPLE NEAREST TO HAND. THE QUARTERLY
FOREIGN AFFAIRS HAS JUST PUBLISHED A SUPERB ACCOUNT OF THE
AMERICAN ROLE IN THAT AFFAR, BY JOHN A. MARCUM, STUDENT
OF ANGOLA AND PROVOST OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT
SANTA CRUZ. IT IS A SOBER, DETAILED STUDY OF THE FACTS
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 100722 TOSEC 110139

AND THE LESSONS: THE ANATOMY OF A FOREIGN-POLICY DISASTER.

4. THE AMERICAN FAILURE IN ANGOLA IS TRACED BY MR. MARCUM TO BASIC DECISIONS MADE EARLY IN THE NIXON YEARS. A POLICY REVIEW COMMISSIONED BY MR. KISSINGER IN 1969 DOUBTED "THE

DEPTH AND PERMANENCE OF BLACK RESOLVE" TO OUST THE PORTUGUESE FROM ANGOLA, AND RULED OUT "A BLACK VICTORY AT ANY STAGE." MR. MARCUM OBSERVES DRILY THAT THIS WAS "THE BASIC MISCALCULATION STEMMING FROM FAULTY INTELLIGENCE, IN BOTH SENSES OF THAT WORD." WHEN THE PORTUGUESE GAVE UP AND DECIDED TO RELINQUISH POWER IN ANGOLA IN 1975, THE UNITED STATES MIGHT HAVE ACTED DIPLOMATICALLY TO PREVENT OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE--FOR EXAMPLE BY CALLING ON THE ORGANIZATION FOR AFRICAN UNITY TO ARBITRATE THE INTERNAL CONFLICTS A PUBLIC POSITION AGAINST ALL FOREIGN INTERVENTION MIGHT HAVE APPEALED TO AFRICANS AND EMBARRASSED THE SOVIET UNION.

5. INSTEAD, THE FORD ADMINISTRATION DECIDED TO GET INTO THE ANGOLAN CONFLICT, SUPPORTING ONE SIDE AS THE SOVIETS SUPPORTED THE OTHER. IN SHORT, MR. KISSINGER CHOSE ANGOLA AS A PLACE TO CONFRONT THE SOVIET UNION. THE RESULT WAS A MODEL OF SELF-INFLICTED DEFEAT.

6. MR. KISSINGER PLAYED A GAME OF MILITARY STRENGTH, WHERE WE WERE AT A DISADVANTAGE, INSTEAD OF POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY. HE INTERVENED COVERTLY--ALMOST ASSURING A CRITICAL REACTION FROM CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC. HE NEVER COMMUNICATED TO MOSCOW A WILLINGNESS TO RESTRAIN OUR SIDE, WHEN IT LOOKED TO BE AHEAD, AND TO HELP ASSURE A COALITION IN ANGOLA. NOT UNTIL LAST OCTOBER, MONTHS TOO LATE, DID HE TELL THE RUSSIANS THAT WE WOULD WORK TO END FOREIGN MILITARY AID AND ENCOURAGE AN AFRICAN SOLUTION IF THEY WOULD DO THE SAME.

7. "A POLICY OF TIT FOR TAT WITH NO COMMUNICATION WAS DOOMED TO FAILURE," MR. MARCUM WRITES. "TO INSIST THAT THE ONLY 'CHIPS' WERE MILITARY CHIPS WAS TO PLAY FROM THE WEAKEST SUIT IN THE AMERICAN HAND."

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 STATE 100722 TOSEC 110139

8. THE WORSE THE MILITARY SITUATION TURNED, THE MORE MR. KISSINGER ESCALATED THE DAMAGE. AGAINST ALL REASON, HE CRIED TO THE WORLD THAT AMERICA'S CREDIBILITY AS LEADER OF THE WEST WAS AT STAKE. HE TREATED THE WINNING ANGOLAN FACTION AS A HATED ENEMY AND SOVIET PAWN, THUS INCREASING ITS DEPENDENCE ON THE SOVIET UNION. HE WINKED AT THE SOUTH AFRICAN INVASION OF ANGOLA, WHICH OUTRAGED EVEN THE BLACK AFRICAN STATES CRITICAL OF THE

SOVIET ROLE.

9. WHAT ARE THE LESSONS OF ANGOLA FOR FUTURE AMERICAN POLICY? ONE SURELY IS THAT WE MUST BEGIN TO SEE AFRICAN PROBLEMS AS AFRICANS SEE THEM--WHICH IS IN TERMS OF PRACTICALITIES, NOT IDEOLOGY. IF RUSSIANS HAVE HELPED

THEM IN A COLONIAL STRUGGLE, AND AMERICANS HELP THE COLONIAL POWER, THEY DO NOT UNDERSTAND WHY A HIGHER IDEALISM SUMMONS THEM TO THE AMERICAN SIDE.

10. SECOND, THE ONE COMMON THEME AMONG THE IMMENSELY VARIED COUNTRIES OF BLACK AFRICA IS OPPOSITION TO WHITE MINORITY RULE. IF THE UNITED STATES WANTS INFLUENCE, OR EVEN RESPECT, THE WORST THING IT CAN DO IS IDENTIFY ITSELF WITH THE REMAINING REDOUBT OF WHITE SUPREMACY, SOUTH AFRICA.

11. THIRD, IT IS A FUNDAMENTAL MISTAKE FOR AMERICA TO TREAT AFRICAN ISSUES IN TERMS OF EAST-WEST CONFRONTATION. TO AFRICANS THAT LOOKS, IN MR. MARCUM'S WORD, "OBSESSIONAL." BY DOING SO IN ANGOLA, WE ACTUALLY WEAKENED AFRICA'S ABILITY TO RESIST SOVIET INTERVENTION.

12. MR. KISSINGER HAS LEARNED SOMETHING FROM THE ANGOLAN DEBACLE, BUT NOT ENOUGH. HE NOW CALLS FOR MAJORITY RULE, BUT HE COUPLES THAT WITH RENEWED WARNINGS TO THE USSR AND CUBA AGAINST MOVING ON FROM ANGOLA TO PLAY A PART ELSEWHERE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.

13. THAT DUAL POLICY SENDS A MURKY SIGNAL. FOR EXAMPLE, IT LEADS THE RULING WHITES IN RHODESIA TO BELIEVE THAT AMERICA WOULD COME IN ON THEIR SIDE IF CUBA HELPED THE UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 STATE 100722 TOSEC 110139

AFRICAN GUERRILLA MOVEMENT--AND HENCE ENCOURAGES THEM TO RESIST ANY CHANGE. BUT IS IT CONCEIVABLE THAT EVEN HENRY KISSINGER WOULD WANT TO GET INTO A WAR ON THE SIDE OF THE TINY WHITE RHODESIAN MINORITY? IF NOT, WHY LET ANYONE THINK HE WOULD?

14. THE BEST WAY FOR THE UNITED STATES TO KEEP THE RUSSIANS AND CUBANS OUT OF RHODESIA IS TO PRESS FOR A QUICK TRANSITION TO MAJORITY RULE THERE, WITHOUT WAR. THAT MEANS HELPING THE EFFORT TO ISOLATE THE WHITES WHO SEIZED AND HOLD POWER, NOT FEEDING THEIR ILLUSIONS.

15. THERE IS NO GUARANTEE THAT WE SHALL LIKE THE POLITICAL RESULT OF CHANGE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. BUT THE CHANGE IS COMING, AND WE ARE MORE LIKELY TO BE CONTENT IF WE HELP

IT THAN IF WE PLAY CANUTE'S ROLE. THAT IS THE LESSON OF
ANGOLA. (END TEXT.) SISCO

UNCLASSIFIED

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: PRESS COMMENTS, MINISTERIAL VISITS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 26 APR 1976
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: n/a
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: n/a
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment:
Disposition Date: 01 JAN 1960
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976STATE100722
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: JCHAMBERLAIN:JC
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: N/A
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D760158-0297
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19760420/aaaaaqtv.tel
Line Count: 171
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN PA
Original Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: n/a
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: buchant0
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 31 AUG 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <31 AUG 2004 by cookms>; APPROVED <13 DEC 2004 by buchant0>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: PRESS MATERIAL
TAGS: SOPN, PFOR, US, XA, AO
To: SECRETARY
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006